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Beyond Neo-Liberalism: The Trade Union Act 2016 and the Authoritarian State 
 
ALAN BOGG, Professor of Labour Law, Hertford College and Faculty of Law, 
University of Oxford 
I am extremely grateful to Ruth Dukes, Keith Ewing, Mark Freedland, and the editors of 
this special issue of the ILJ, for penetrating and critical insights. I have discussed the 
issues in public lectures at the Manchester Industrial Relations Society and to the 
REMARK LAB project in Stockholm, and I am grateful to Ralph Darlington and Niklas 
Bruun for the invitations to lecture. I am also indebted to Rachel Hunter for brilliant 
research assistance. Needless to say, all errors are my own. 
ABSTRACT 
The Trade Union Act 2016 marks a historically significant realignment in the ideological 
politics of trade union regulation. It represents a more authoritarian style of Conservative 
ideology and statecraft in the sphere of trade union regulation, and this is reflected in 
three main characteristics: (i) a repressive strategy of de-democratisation, undermining 
political resistance and stifling dissent in the democratic process; (ii) heavier reliance on 
direct State coercion, including the techniques of criminalisation, alongside the 
empowerment of employers to use civil law remedies against trade unions and workers in 
industrial action situations; (iii) the elevation of social order in the regulation of strike 
activity. The article then considers the likely prospects of the legislation, and the wider 
ideological significance of this turn towards authoritarianism for Conservative political 
thought ‘beyond neo-liberalism’. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The task of assessing the significance of a single piece of legislation within months of its 
enactment is fraught with interpretive risks and difficulties. On any sensible view of the 
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matter, however, the Trade Union Act 2016 stands as one of the most radical and 
important pieces of trade union legislation to have been enacted in a generation. The 
article will examine the ideological significance of the Trade Union Act 2016, evaluating 
it against the historical context of the ‘neo-liberal’ reforms of labour law during the 
previous Conservative governments between 1979 and 1997.  The principal argument 
developed here is that the new Conservative approach to industrial relations, as 
manifested in the legislative activity leading to the enactment of the Trade Union Act 
2016, is to take labour law ‘beyond neo-liberalism’. In so doing, it reflects a highly 
authoritarian strand of Conservative ideology which, rather than being neo-liberal, is 
anti-liberal in its orientation.1 This is reflected in the systematic undermining of political 
opposition both in the sphere of party politics and in wider civil society, the State’s 
increasing recourse to the direct use of coercion and criminal penalties to pacify workers 
and trade unions, and the elevation of unity and social order over agonistic expressions of 
industrial and political dissent. The social and political context of the legislation is then 
discussed, focusing in particular on the ways in which devolution, human rights, and 
trade union organisational strategies might influence the operation of the legislation. 
While the full significance of the Trade Union Act 2016 cannot be appreciated in advance 
of its social impact on the industrial relations system, the Act may prove to be a 
watershed moment in the history of labour legislation. 
 
 
                                                        
1 On anti-liberalism in certain strands of Conservative political thought, see David Dyzenhaus (ed), Law as Politics: Carl Schmitt’s 
Critique of Liberalism (Duke UP 1998). 
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2. THE BACKGROUND TO THE ACT 
The Conservative Manifesto proposals for trade union reform were tucked away in a 
compressed couple of paragraphs in the chapter on ‘Jobs for all’.2 It proposed new 
turnout thresholds for strike ballots, and a ‘tougher threshold’ of 40% overall support for 
strike action in ‘essential public services’ identified as ‘health, education, fire and 
transport’.3 In addition, the manifesto proposed to repeal ‘nonsensical’ restrictions on the 
use of agency labour during strikes; limiting the mandate period for strike ballots; 
tackling the ‘intimidation’ of non-striking workers; ensuring an opt-in process for union 
subscriptions; tightening the rules on paid facility time in the public sector; and reforming 
the role of the Certification Officer (CO). In the later chapter, ‘Making government work 
better for you’, new measures to establish an ‘opt-in’ arrangement for trade union 
political funds were proposed, though this was set out alongside a commitment to seek a 
comprehensive agreement on party funding reform.4 This linkage in the manifesto 
undermines the argument that the regulation of political funds was a trade union reform 
measure, rather than a partisan attempt to restrict the funding of the Labour Party. 
 Many of these proposals seem to have originated in an obscure ‘research note’ 
produced for the right-wing think tank Policy Exchange, ‘Modernising Industrial 
Relations’.5 Students of labour legislation history, accustomed to the depth and rigour of 
Hayek’s magisterial oeuvre as a compass for Conservative policy, will be sorely 
                                                        
2 See the Conservative Party Manifesto: Conservative Party, ‘Strong Leadership A Clear Economic Plan A Brighter, More Secure 
Future’ (2015) 18–19. Available at https://www.conservatives.com/manifesto accessed 6 June 2016. 
3 Note that the Act now extends to ‘important’ public services, and the list of services has been extended to include decommissioning 
of nuclear installations and management of radioactive waste and spent fuel; and border security. One of the Government’s arguments 
in favour of a wide margin of appreciation under Article 11 is the existence of a clear manifesto commitment to legislate on trade 
unions (see letter from Sajid Javid to Harriet Harman, Chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights (5 January 2016) 2. Available 
at <http://www.parliament.uk/documents/joint-committees/human-rights/Letter_from_Sajid_Javid_050116.pdf> accessed 6 June 
2016). The slippage from ‘essential’ to ‘important’ public services, from the manifesto to the Act, undermines that claim. 
4 Conservative Party Manifesto (n 2) 49. 
5 Ed Holmes, Andrew Lilico and Tom Flanagan, ‘Modernising Industrial Relations’ (Policy Exchange, September 2010) 
<http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/images/publications/modernising%20industrial%20relations%20-%20sep%2010.pdf> accessed  6 
June 2016. 
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disappointed by the thinness of ‘Modernising Industrial Relations’. It is peppered with 
legal inaccuracies,6 and its use of economic arguments is selective.7 Whatever the note 
lacks in terms of its intellectual rigour, it more than makes up for in the boldness of its 
extensive proposals for legislative reform. Many of these proposals were contained in the 
original Trade Union Bill: (i) more detailed information to be contained on the strike 
ballot paper; (ii) a requirement of 50% turnout in strike ballots; (iii) a requirement of 40% 
voting in favour of strike action; (iv) permitting employers to use agency staff during 
strikes; (v) lengthening the standard notice period for strike action to 14 days; (vi) 
restricting ‘taxpayer funding’ of facility time; (vii) tightening the rules on union political 
funds favouring an opt-in scheme for members; and (viii) banning ‘check off’ 
arrangements in the public sector.   
 It is also worthwhile setting out those Policy Exchange proposals that did not 
make it into the Bill, for they may give a flavour of what is to come if the Trade Union 
Act turns out to be the first legislative step in a more ambitious programme of reform: (i) 
reducing unfair dismissal protection for strikers, so that they are protected from selective 
dismissal for the first eight weeks of the dispute only; (ii) banning strike action in 
contexts of ‘essential’ goods and services; (iii) requiring a secret ballot in all cases of 
statutory union recognition claims; (iv) requiring that a union meets a minimum 
membership threshold of 10% before a strike ballot can be called; (v) liberalising the 
Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (TULRCA 1992), s 145B, 
                                                        
6 For example, at page 2, we are told that ‘industrial relations law, almost uniquely, provides extensive immunities from liability for 
tort and breach of contract’. I am unaware of any existing statutory ‘immunity’ against actions for breach of contract occurring during 
a strike, as cases like National Coal Board v Galley [1958] 1 WLR 16 (CA) demonstrate. At page 9, the authors offer the surprising 
revelation that ‘the election of a Labour Government marked a radical departure from its predecessor’, such that ‘statutory protection 
for trade unions against prosecution sharply increased’. Again, I am not aware of any statutory provisions that provided trade unions 
with immunity from criminal prosecution during the ‘New Labour’ era. 
7 The ‘note’ is based upon the principal argument that collective bargaining is justified as a regulatory response to the monopsony 
power of employers. Since the monopsony power of employers is declining, labour laws need to be ‘modernised’ to reflect the new 
labour market context. For an alternative and powerful view of the economic arguments in favour of collective bargaining, see Lydia 
Hayes and Tonia Novitz, Trade Unions and Economic Inequality (Institute of Employment Rights 2014). 
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which currently restricts ‘offers’ where the employer’s ‘sole or main purpose’ is that 
workers’ terms will no longer be determined by a collective agreement, in order to 
expand the scope for individual negotiation; and (vi) using competition law to challenge 
the ‘monopoly’ position of trade unions in the provision of union services.8 
 During the Parliamentary process, the Bill underwent significant changes.9 The 
Government suffered important defeats in the House of Lords, on electronic balloting for 
strike ballots,10 limiting the ‘opt in’ to the political fund to new members,11 and the 
imposition of safeguards limiting the scope for Ministers to restrict facility time by 
secondary legislation. The Government was also weakened politically by the impending 
EU Referendum, and the need to garner trade union support for the ‘remain’ campaign. 
This led to a more conciliatory tone in the later stages of the Bill, reflected perhaps in the 
volte-face on the proposed ban on the check off in the public sector.12 In many ways, 
then, the final version of Trade Union Act 2016 is the tip of a much larger ideological 
iceberg. It is important to keep this context in mind in assessing the broader significance 
of the legislation, for the Act reflects what was politically achievable rather than what 
was politically desired by the Government. 
 The main provisions of the Act cover a wide range of trade union matters, 
although some of the provisions will require further specification through secondary 
legislation. In brief, the legislation addresses the following five matters: (i) restrictions on 
                                                        
8 Interestingly, the ‘research note’ did not address the matter of alleged intimidatory tactics on picket lines. This element of the Act’s 
reforms may be traced back to the review commissioned by the Government and led by Bruce Carr QC: ‘The Carr Report: The Report 
of the Independent Review of the Law Governing Industrial Disputes’ (October 2014). Available at 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/363806/Carr_Review_Report.pdf> accessed 6 June 
2016 (Carr Report). 
9 On the provisions in the Bill, see Michael Ford and Tonia Novitz, ‘An Absence of Fairness... Restrictions on Industrial Action and 
Protest in the Trade Union Bill 2015’ (2015) 44 ILJ 522.For an account that places recent reforms in historical context, see Paul 
Smith, ‘Labour under the law: a new law of combination, and master and servant, in 21st century Britain?’ (2016) 46 Industrial 
Relations Journal 345. 
10 HL Deb 16 March 2016, vol 769, cols 1854–1868; HC Deb 27 April 2016, vol 608, cols 1471–1500. 
11 HL Deb 16 March 2016, vol 769, cols 1871–1895; HC Deb 27 April 2016, vol 608, cols 1505–1520. 
12 HL Deb 19 April 2016, vol 771, cols 583–585; HL Deb 25 April 2016, vol 771, cols 909–913; HC Deb 27 April 2016, vol 608, cols 
1506–1520. 
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the right to strike, especially in relation to new ballot thresholds and notice requirements; 
(ii) tightening the law on picketing and protest; (iii) restricting the political voice of trade 
unions by switching to an ‘opt-in’ scheme for trade union political funds, applying to new 
members following a transitional period; (iv) new investigative powers for the CO, 
including the power to impose quasi-criminal penalties in certain circumstances; (v) 
curtailing the organisational supports for public sector trade unionism, by limiting the 
check off and facility time in the public sector. The legislation thus constitutes a bold, 
ambitious and comprehensive attack on trade union freedoms. 
 
3. BEYOND NEO-LIBERALISM: THE RISE OF THE AUTHORITARIAN 
STATE 
 
The first reflex of the labour lawyer is no doubt to assess the significance of the Trade 
Union Act 2016 in historical context of the legislative reforms to trade union law enacted 
between 1979 and 1997. This provides a useful starting point for analysis. In retrospect, 
two scholarly engagements with that period stand out. First, the work of Davies and 
Freedland on legislative history in Labour Legislation and Public Policy provides a rich 
and judicious account of the development of ‘neo-liberal’ labour market reforms during 
the period 1979-1990.13 The leitmotif of their work is that the restriction of trade union 
power was a central plank in a wider strategy of restructuring the economy and the 
achievement of a ‘free’ labour market.14 It blends a careful historical analysis of the 
legislative history of the period, analysed in its wider political and economic context. 
Secondly, the work of Lord Wedderburn in ‘Freedom of Association and Philosophies of 
                                                        
13 Paul Davies and Mark Freedland, Labour Legislation and Public Policy: A Contemporary History (Clarendon Press 1993).  
14 ibid chs 9–10. 
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Labour Law’ endures as a masterpiece of the period, subjecting the legislative reforms of 
the period to a searing ideological critique.15 In particular, Wedderburn was keen to 
emphasise the profound influence of Friedrich von Hayek’s liberal political philosophy 
on the broad pattern of trade union reforms during the period. These two perspectives 
should be regarded as complementary. While Davies and Freedland are keen to 
emphasise the responsiveness of successive Governments to the incremental experience 
of legislative reforms, and Wedderburn is keen to emphasise the grand ideological 
architecture of the entire edifice, there is no significant conflict between the two 
enterprises. Indeed, the cautious incrementalism of Conservative reforms of trade union 
law traced in Davies and Freedland’s work may itself be a reflection of Hayek’s rejection 
of ‘constructive rationalism’, and his general suspicion of the powers of human reason to 
reorder society to a political blueprint.16  
 
Davies and Freedland argued that three principal movements in the restriction of trade 
union power could be detected across the entire pattern of trade union legislation during 
that period. Refracting those movements through Wedderburn’s work on legal ideology 
enables us to identify the neo-liberal underpinning to each element. First, Davies and 
Freedland identified the ‘de-politicisation’ of trade unions through the dismantling of 
corporatist arrangements and a negation of trade unions as public constitutional actors. 
This ‘de-politicisation’ may be understood as an attempt to ‘constitutionalise’ the ‘free 
market’ order, and to protect it from encroachment through the enactment of ‘social 
legislation’ brought about by the political pressure group activities of trade unions. 
                                                        
15 Lord Wedderburn, ‘Freedom of Association and Philosophies of Labour Law’ (1989) 18 ILJ 1. 
16 On Hayek and ‘evolutionary rationalism’, see Andrew Gamble, Hayek: The Iron Cage of Liberty (Polity Press, 1996) 32 where he 
suggests of Hayek’s ‘evolutionary’ approach to rationalism that, ‘An evolutionary rationalist might propose a change to a 
particular rule, but the change would always be cautious, incremental, and experimental.’  
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Wedderburn’s analysis is astute to this feature of Hayek’s work, which was the framing 
of a ‘constitution of liberty’ to ensure that the law as a system of general rules of just 
conduct was immunised from interference by democratically elected political elites.17  
 
The second movement was an underlying strategy of encouragement of employers to 
resist the demands of trade unions through the techniques of the civil law, rather than the 
direct deployment of coercion by the State to restrict trade union power. Although Davies 
and Freedland do not connect this strategy to an ideological base, in my view this 
movement reflects deeper themes in Hayek’s work. For Hayek, liberty can only be 
achieved through what he described as ‘nomos’, or the law of liberty.18 This 
encompassed general and abstract rules of just conduct, embodied in the evolutionary 
wisdom of the common law, with its protection of freedom of contract and private 
property.  Hayek decried the enactment of ‘special legislation’ favouring interest groups 
such as trade unions, and the growing tendencies of the bureaucratic state ‘in conferring 
discretionary and essentially irresponsible powers on administrative authority.’19 While 
Hayek admitted that ‘special legislation’ might be ‘the only practicable way of restoring 
the principles of freedom’,20 his fundamental commitment was to the restoration of 
common law rules as the basis for a free society. This favoured the private enforcement 
of common law rights, over the extension of arbitrary public coercive power. Since the 
complex statutory provisions regulating strike action simply provided a shrinking set of 
statutory immunities from existing common law liabilities, the use of injunctions by 
employers to challenge strike action provided a procedural mechanism enabling the 
                                                        
17 Wedderburn (n 15) 14. 
18 FA Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty (Routledge, 1982) chapter 5. 
19 FA Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Routledge, 1960) 279. 
20 ibid 279. 
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employer to vindicate its subsisting common law rights. The detailed statutory focus of 
much of the strike litigation during the 1980s tended to obscure this basic point, and its 
deeper linkage to Hayek’s commitment to the primacy of private law as ‘nomos’. 
 
Finally, Davies and Freedland identified the theme of discouraging solidaristic practices 
amongst workers and trade unions. This was to be achieved through the introduction of 
legal mechanisms, such as secret ballots, which fostered individualistic behaviour within 
trade unions. Again, Hayek’s work sheds light on this phenomenon. Hayek was troubled 
by the use of ‘coercion’ by trade unions against workers, and this was reflected in his 
hostility to closed shops and industrial picketing.21 ‘Solidarity’ represented an atavistic 
instinct that was incompatible with the only freedom that could be achieved in a modern 
society, through the enforcement of a market order.22 Solidaristic habits needed to be 
disrupted so that the acquisitive moral instincts upon which a market order depended 
could be inculcated afresh. In this way, the balloting measures were important in 
symbolising the separation of each sovereign individual and prioritising her own 
competitive will over the needs of her fellows. 
 
It is tempting to read these ideological movements of ‘neo-liberalism’ into the new 
provisions of the Trade Union Act. On this view, the Act simply picks up the familiar 
neo-liberal story that was paused, or at least mollified, during the intervening period 
between 1997 and 2015. Such a reading would be complacent and mistaken. The new 
ideology represents a much more authoritarian form of Conservatism. Considering the 
                                                        
21 ibid 274-275. 
22 Gamble (n 16) chapter 3.  
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Trade Union Act 2016 in its wider legal and political context, the new authoritarian 
Conservatism displays three main points of distinction: first, it moves from ‘de-
politicisation’ to a more fundamental process of ‘de-democratisation’ of trade unions and 
other actors in civil society; secondly, there is a marked preference for direct State 
coercion, reflected in the progressive supplementation of civil law remedies administered 
by employers, to be flanked by criminal law measures administered and enforced directly 
by the State; finally, there is an important shift in justification for internal union 
democracy focused on an external concern to enforce the unity of the ‘social order’. 
  
It is certainly true, as Wedderburn has emphasised, that neo-liberalism depended upon a 
‘strong state’ to enforce the general rules of just conduct underpinning the spontaneous 
order of the market.23 Nevertheless, Hayek was utterly opposed to totalitarianism. He was 
concerned to defend a constitution of liberty. Hayek’s objection to special legal 
‘privileges’ for trade unions focused on the Trade Disputes Act 1906: he did not argue for 
a restoration of 19th century criminalisation of collective activities.24 Legislation was 
needed to restore ‘the same general principles of law that apply to everybody else’.25 
Indeed, he was explicit on the limits of legislation as a technique for restoring the market 
order: ‘legal prohibition of unions would…not be justifiable. In a free society much that 
is undesirable has to be tolerated if it cannot be prevented without discriminatory 
legislation.’26 Given this reasoning, it seems to me to be highly doubtful that he would 
have regarded the expansion of the CO’s administrative discretion and use of quasi-
criminal penalties as anything other than the degradation of the Rule of Law through an 
                                                        
23 Wedderburn (n 15) 15. 
24 Hayek (n 19) 268. 
25 ibid 279. 
26 Ibid 275. 
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expansion of arbitrary discretionary powers. In light of Hayek’s commitment to 
federalism as a constitutional check on arbitrary central government,27 the proposals to 
abolish check off and facility time would also seem to constitute the unjust application of 
coercion through special legislation. While it is certainly true that Hayek was explicit 
about the risks that mass democracy posed to the Rule of Law and human freedom,28 this 
did not set him apart from many other liberal thinkers in the middle decades of the 
twentieth century.29 The blatant partiality of some of the recent measures on party 
funding, ‘special’ social legislation in its own way, would be anathema to Hayek’s 
account of the Rule of Law. In the conclusion, we return to the question of how best to 
make sense of the new authoritarianism represented by the Trade Union Act measures. 
 
4. FROM ‘DE-POLITICISATION’ TO ‘DE-DEMOCRATISATION’ 
 
Davies and Freedland identified the strategy of ‘de-politicisation’ of trade unions as a 
dominant element in the Conservative Government’s wider strategy of restructuring the 
labour market. This involved the deconstruction of corporatist practices and institutions, 
as a way of marginalising the political voice of organised labour. As the Trade Union Act 
1984 demonstrated, it extended further still to the regulation of trade union political 
funds. Following the discussions in the 1983 Green Paper Democracy in Trade Unions,30 
the 1984 Act tightened legal regulation on the political fund, through the statutory 
requirement of a periodic ballot procedure and an individual right to ‘opt out’ of the 
political fund. Significantly, and as reflected in the Green Paper, this was justified 
                                                        
27 Ibid 184. 
28 Gamble (n 16) 91-97. 
29 Jan-Werner Muller, ‘What, if anything, is wrong with Hayek’s model constitution?’, in David Dyzenhaus and Thomas Poole (eds), 
Law, Liberty and State: Oakeshott, Hayek and Schmidt on the Rule of Law (CUP, 2015) 261, 262. 
30 Department of Employment, Democracy in Trade Unions (Green Paper, Cmnd 8778, 1983)  ch 4. 
12 
 
principally in terms of the internal democratisation of trade unions. This strategy of ‘de-
politicisation’ would provide the foundations for a ‘constitution of liberty’,31 by 
preventing trade unions from deploying their political power to secure legislation that 
would otherwise interfere with the spontaneous order of a free labour market.  
 There may be a temptation to regard the new provisions on the political fund in 
the current Trade Union Act as a simple reprise of the debates in 1983 - 1984. After all, 
the possibility of a switch from ‘opt out’ to ‘opt in’ was canvassed explicitly in the 1983 
Green Paper.32 This simple reading of continuity would be a mistake.  The new 
provisions on the political fund in the Trade Union Act are far more intrusive than 
anything that would have been regarded as politically feasible or appropriate by the 
architects of the 1984 scheme. The Trade Union Act reforms must be viewed as a part of 
a wider political strategy to suppress political opposition and dissent in the political 
process and wider civil society, of which the Trade Union Act 2016 is only a part. While 
trade unions are the principal target in this strategy of suppression, charities and even 
opposition political parties are now experiencing its repressive effects. This reflects what 
might be described as a strategy of ‘de-democratisation’, which is altogether more 
repressive than the ‘de-politicisation’ detected by Davies and Freedland in the legislative 
activities of the previous Conservative governments. 
 The Trade Union Act now provides in section 11 that it is unlawful for a union 
member to be required to make a contribution to the political fund if the member has not 
given the trade union an ‘opt-in notice’ (or if the member has given notice of withdrawal 
from an ‘opt-in’ notice). The trade union is also subject to an obligation to notify its 
                                                        
31 On the constitutional foundations of ‘neo-liberalism’, see FA Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Routledge 1960); see also Andrew 
Gamble, Hayek: The Iron Cage of Liberty (Polity Press 1996) ch 6. 
32 Democracy in Trade Unions (n 30) 24–28. 
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members of their right to withdraw from the political fund. The ‘opt-in’ regime is subject 
to a transitional arrangement, and it applies only to members who join at the end of a 
period not less than 12 months following the entry into force of the relevant provisions. 
This is coupled with cumbersome reporting obligations, set out in section 12, where, if 
the union spends more than £2000 per year in total from its political fund, details of 
political expenditure must be included in the annual return to the CO in a highly 
prescriptive form. While the final provisions in the Act are intrusive enough, these 
measures are significantly diluted from the original proposals in the Bill, which had 
countenanced a universal ‘opt-in’ scheme for all members, requiring renewal on a 5-year 
cycle. The proposals to regulate the political fund attracted fierce resistance in the House 
of Lords, and the measures in the Act no doubt reflect the Government’s sense of what 
was politically feasible rather than ideologically desirable. It is also important to evaluate 
these reforms within a wider political context.  
 There are four main grounds for regarding section 11 as one element in a broader 
repressive ‘de-democratisation’ strategy designed to stifle political opposition and 
dissent. First, the intervention and deliberations of the specially constituted House of 
Lords Select Committee on Trade Union Political Funds and Political Party Funding, 
coupled with the recent proposals to cut public funding of opposition parties, support the 
view that the political fund reforms are a partisan and one-sided attack on a political 
opposition party. Secondly, the restrictions on the political activities of civil society 
actors (including but not confined to trade unions) in Part II of the Transparency of 
Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act 2014 (TLA; the 
so-called ‘Gagging Act’) also seem to have a disproportionate silencing effect on political 
14 
 
challenges to an austerity agenda. Thirdly, the Government’s hostility to ‘leverage’ 
activities between workers and consumers appears to be directed at limiting opportunities 
for civic solidarity between striking workers and consumers. Finally, the role of ‘nudge’ 
behavioural economics in the framing of ‘opt-in’ choice regimes provides further support 
that the political fund regime has been deliberately chosen because of its predictable 
dampening effects on political contributions to the Labour Party. We shall take each of 
these arguments in turn. 
 Let us begin with the House of Lords Select Committee, set up in response to 
widespread concern in the Lords about the political fund proposals. The Committee 
offered a powerful evidence-based critique of the Bill.33 Significantly, Baroness Neville-
Rolfe’s view that the political fund proposals were concerned with trade union reform 
rather than party funding reform did not carry weight with the Committee.34 That is also 
difficult to reconcile with the original positioning of the political fund proposals in the 
Conservative Manifesto.35 The Committee considered that the switch to an opt-out 
system ‘could have a sizeable negative effect on the number of union members 
participating in political funds’,36 translating into a significant drop in the funding for the 
Labour Party.37 In the view of the Select Committee, ‘If any government were to use its 
majority unilaterally to inflict significant damage on the finances of opposition parties, it 
would risk starting a tit-for-tat conflict which could harm parliamentary democracy’.38 
The suspicion that this is part of a longer game to undermine political opposition was 
given further support by the announcement in the Spending Review and Autumn 
                                                        
33 Trade Union Political Funds and Political Party Funding Committee, Report of Session 2015–16 (HL 2015–16, 106). 
34 HL Deb 20 January 2016, vol 769, cols 778–780. 
35 Conservative Party Manifesto (n 2) 49. 
36 Trade Union Political Funds and Political Party Funding Committee (n 33) para 74. 
37 ibid para 100. 
38  ibid para 115. 
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Statement 2015, published on 25 November 2015, which proposed the reduction of Short 
Money allocations to opposition parties by 19% and then freezing them for the remainder 
of the Parliament.39 It is difficult to resist the conclusion, fortified by the reasoning of the 
Select Committee, that the political fund reforms constitute a partisan attempt to hobble 
the capacities of the Labour Party to act as a credible opposition.  
 Secondly, it is significant that these measures were proposed against the backdrop 
of the highly restrictive Part II of the ‘Gagging Act’. This legislation places strict 
financial limits on the use of funds for political campaigning by ‘non-party’ entities such 
as charities or trade unions. Its popular description as the ‘Gagging Act’ reflected 
widespread concern that this would have a chilling effect on the ability of civil society 
groups to engage as sources of grassroots opposition in the democratic process. There is 
now significant evidence that the effect of the legislation has been to stifle the political 
advocacy of charities, especially on social issues during the austerity crisis.40 The latest 
step in the suppression of dissenting activities by civil society groups is the recent 
announcement by the Cabinet Office Minister, Matthew Hancock, that charities will no 
longer be able to use government grants for political lobbying.41 Given the pivotal role of 
politics in shaping the collective structures that determine the social and economic fates 
of citizens, these measures are particularly troubling. Engaging in politics will often be 
the most effective way for the charity to pursue its charitable objectives successfully, 
especially in contexts such as poverty, child welfare, and housing. 
                                                        
39 Richard Kelly, ‘Short Money’ (Briefing Paper 01663, House of Commons Library 22 March 2016). Available at 
<http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN01663#fullreport> accessed 6 June 2016.  
40 Commission on Civil Society and Democratic Engagement, Non-Party Campaigning Ahead of Elections (Report 4, September 
2015). Available at <http://civilsocietycommission.info/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/FINAL-Civil-Society-Commission-Report-no4-
Sept-2015.pdf> accessed 6 June 2016. 
41 Christopher Hope and Victoria Ward, ‘Charities to be Banned from Using Public Funds to Lobby Ministers’ The Telegraph 
(London, 5 February 2016) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/12143479/Charities-to-be-banned-from-using-public-funds-to-
lobby-ministers.html> accessed 6 June 2016. 
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 Thirdly, many of the Government’s objections to ‘leverage’ protest have 
coalesced on concerns about democratic engagement between striking workers and 
consumers.42 While ‘leverage’ protests undoubtedly reach beyond consumers, extending 
to other workers, families of managing executives, shareholders, and suppliers, the 
democratic relationship between producers and consumers is of particular significance to 
the Government. As we shall see, the principal justification for elevated thresholds for 
strike ballots is protection of the consumer interest in uninterrupted goods and services. 
Driving a civic wedge between consumption and production is an important element in 
the Government’s wider political strategy of denigrating producers.  Its effect is also to 
democratically disempower consumers by conceiving of consumption in narrowly 
economistic rather than civic terms.  
This stifling of protest activities, with the aim of suppressing the creation of 
coalitions of interest between workers and consumers, is thus an attack on transversal 
freedom of association across different groups. This transversal freedom of association 
underpins a vibrant pluralist democracy. As Kolben has argued, consumption can itself be 
configured as a form of civic participation, as ‘a means of expressing ideas and engaging 
in action to change the world’.43 This civic framing of consumption requires that 
‘consumer-citizens must feel obligations towards workers; power and influence over 
companies with whom they do business; and solidarity with like-minded consumer 
citizens’.44 The insulation of consumers from industrial protest separates workers from 
consumer-citizens, and it undermines the pluralist basis of a democratic order. 
                                                        
42 Carr Report (n 8) 80–81, Theme 6. 
43 Kevin Kolben, ‘Transnational Private Labour Regulation, Consumer-Citizenship and the Consumer Imaginary’ in Adelle Blackett 
and Anne Trebilcock (eds), Research Handbook on Transnational Labour Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2015). 
44 ibid 371. 
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 Finally, it is untenable that the Government was unaware of the likely 
consequences of a switch from ‘opt out’ to ‘opt in’ in the political fund context. 
Government policy has famously been shaped by the influence of the ‘Nudge Unit’, also 
known as the ‘Behavioural Insights Team’.45 This unit has deployed insights from 
‘behavioural law and economics’ to reflect upon the ways in which regulatory 
frameworks can ‘nudge’ citizens to choose options favoured by policy makers. The 
setting of regulatory ‘defaults’ can have a profound shaping effect on civic preferences.46 
Defaults tend to be ‘sticky’, such that ‘opt-out’ regimes will generally favour much 
higher participation rates than ‘opt-in’ regimes.47 Indeed, the ‘Nudge Unit’ recognised 
this very phenomenon in its research on how to improve the rate of charitable 
donations.48 The setting of ‘defaults’ also performs important signalling effects in terms 
of the legitimacy of specific choice options.49 This raises serious issues of political 
principle, where governments engage in the deliberate yet covert manipulation of 
citizens’ preferences through institutional design.50 It also reveals the likely agenda of the 
Government in pressing for the adoption of an ‘opt-in’ framework for political 
contributions: to ensure that funding for the main opposition party was reduced. 
 Thus, the political fund reforms in the Trade Union Act must not be isolated from 
the wider regulatory context. They form part of a package of measures that, taken 
cumulatively, can be regarded as repressive of oppositional political activity, hence a 
                                                        
45 See <http://www.behaviouralinsights.co.uk/> accessed 6 June 2016. 
46 Cass R Sunstein, ‘Human Behavior and the Law of Work’ (2001) 87 Virginia Law Review 205. Ewan McGaughey, ‘Can 
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strategy of ‘de-democratisation’. The democratic implications of this shift in public 
policy radiate far beyond the confines of labour law.51 
5. STATE AUTHORITARIANISM: FROM PRIVATE TO PUBLIC COERCION 
A second characteristic strategy of the neo-liberal State during the Thatcher years was the 
empowerment of employers and trade union members to resist trade union demands 
through civil litigation.52 This aimed at the reduction of trade union power, albeit through 
the private enforcement of legal norms in ordinary civil litigation. While this certainly 
involved the use of State coercion, the State’s coercive role was deployed indirectly in 
the enforcement of private rights rather than directly through the techniques of the 
criminal law or direct governmental interference in trade union autonomy. This 
‘privatisation’ of the task of reducing trade union power to private parties was a mixture 
of prudence and principle. Prudentially, it enabled the State to avoid damaging stand-offs 
with the trade union movement. It also reflected a principled neo-liberal concern to 
restrict State coercion in the regulation of civil society.  
 The recent legislative activities of the Conservative Government signal a step 
change in the coercive profile of the State, and exemplify a distinctive authoritarian turn. 
Undoubtedly, some of the newly enacted measures on industrial action, such as the new 
provisions on information to be included on the voting paper in industrial action ballots,53 
or the revised rules on strike notices,54 are designed to multiply the opportunities for 
employers to challenge the applicability of the trade dispute defence in injunction 
                                                        
51 See KD Ewing, ‘The Importance of Trade Union Political Voice: Labour Law Meets Constitutional Law’ in Alan Bogg and Tonia 
Novitz (eds), Voices at Work: Continuity and Change in the Common Law World (OUP 2014). 
52 Davies and Freedland (n 13) 427. 
53 Trade Union Act 2016, s 5. 
54 ibid s 8. 
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proceedings. In this respect, there are important continuities with the more familiar neo-
liberal pattern of empowering employer resistance to trade union demands.  
 Significantly, however, other measures countenance a more direct role for State 
supervision, monitoring and coercive control of trade unions and their members. This 
constitutes a significant reconfiguration of the contours of State coercion in the sphere of 
industrial relations. It is certainly reflected in some of the enacted provisions in the Trade 
Union Act 2016, especially as regards the expanded role of the CO. It is reflected more 
strongly still in many of the ideas for legislative action that were dropped during the 
progress of the Trade Union Bill. It is nevertheless important to consider the whole 
pattern of legislative activity rather than focusing narrowly on the enacted provisions in 
the Act itself. This new pattern of direct State coercion is displayed in three main areas of 
governmental activity: the legislative proposals for regulation of picketing; the legislative 
proposals on restricting ‘check off’ and facility time in the public sector; and the enacted 
provisions concerning the role and functions of the CO. 
A. Picketing, Protest and the Authoritarian State 
 
The Government’s concern with picketing and protest had its origins in the ill-fated ‘Carr 
Review’, which focused on the alleged use of ‘extreme’ or ‘intimidatory’ ‘leverage’ 
tactics in industrial disputes.55 The trigger for this review was the dispute between 
UNITE and INEOS at the Grangemouth Chemicals and Refinery Plant.56 The final 
Report confined itself to summarising the submission of employer evidence on alleged 
                                                        
55 Carr Report (n 8). See Rajeev Syal, ‘Union Law Review Frozen After Barrister Objects to Ministerial Statements’ The Guardian 
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56 Carr Report (n 8) 3. 
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‘extreme’ tactics in a number of industrial disputes, and it produced no proposals for 
legal reform. As its own author acknowledged, the report was of little evidential value 
given that it simply collated unsubstantiated employer allegations.57  
 In July 2015, the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) 
commenced a consultation on the reform of picketing and protest law in parallel with the 
introduction of the Trade Union Bill.58 Ostensibly, this consultation was directed at 
considering new legal measures to prevent the ‘intimidation of non-striking workers’ 
during industrial disputes. An examination of the substantive scope of the Consultation 
indicated that the title of the consultation document was disingenuous. The BIS 
Consultation, like the Carr Review before it, conceptualised the social problem of 
‘leverage’ in a much more expansive way, of which the alleged intimidation of non-
striking workers was only part. The BIS Consultation extended its scope to the use of 
‘leverage’ tactics against senior managers, and suppliers and customers of the primary 
employer in dispute with the trade union.59 This might involve the use of vigorous public 
protest to embarrass senior managers attending black tie dinners through the use of props 
such as inflatable black rats,60 or raising awareness of bad employment practices with 
customers of the employer.  
 The specific proposals for consideration in the BIS Consultation disclose an 
important shift in governmental strategy. Thus, the Consultation states that ‘[e]mployers 
                                                        
57 ibid 1. 
58 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, ‘Trade Union Bill: Consultation on Tackling Intimidation of Non-Striking 
Workers’ (BIS/15/415, July 2015). Available at 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/445439/BIS-15-415-tackling-intimidation-of-non-
striking-workers.pdf> accessed 6 June 2016. (BIS/15/415). 
59 ibid para 5. See also Carr Report (n 8) 80–81 and ch 5, Themes 2, 4, 5 and 6. 
60 Carr Report (n 8) para 4.115. 
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report that enforcing civil offences through the courts can be time-consuming and 
potentially expensive and slow’.61 In turn, this tentativeness in respect of civil 
enforcement provides a justification for ratcheting up more coercive measures to be 
deployed directly by the State. The Consultation contemplates contemplated use of 
criminal sanctions in the restriction of ‘leverage’ protest. It identifies as a ‘key challenge’ 
the need to ‘promote effective policing and prosecution of intimidation and other 
offences arising in the context of industrial disputes’,62 and suggests that the Government 
will work with the police and the CPS to ensure that the existing catalogue of criminal 
offences (including anti-social behaviour provisions) will be used more extensively and 
effectively against protesters using ‘leverage’ tactics.63 Alongside the push for greater 
utilisation of existing criminal offences by the police and prosecuting authorities, the 
Consultation also raises the prospect of further criminalisation in the form of a new 
offence of ‘intimidation on the picket line’, targeted specifically at ‘leverage’ protest in 
industrial disputes.64 This was linked to proposals for increased provision for the 
monitoring and scrutiny of public protest through State agencies It was also envisaged 
that there might be tighter regulation of the use of online and social media in protest 
activity, and there will be a reformulation of the Code of Practice in due course to reflect 
this. These restrictive measures would be further facilitated by an expanded remit for the 
CO,65 and the possibility that trade unions might be subject to a legal duty to provide 
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advance notice of the details of picketing and wider protest strategies ‘to employers, the 
police and the CO by publishing their plans’.66 
The responses to the BIS Consultation were overwhelmingly hostile to proposals for 
further expansion of criminalisation.67 It is difficult to assess whether the Government 
was moved by these responses or by the ratcheting pressure of external political events, 
but whatever the explanation, the worst excesses of the authoritarian State were tempered 
in the final provisions of the Trade Union Act relevant to picketing and protest. The 
major changes are set out in section 10 and specify new preconditions of statutory 
immunity in relation to picket supervisors. 
It should not be assumed, however, that the coercive teeth of these measures have been 
pulled. The collusion between the police and blacklisting organisations in the 
identification of trade union activists indicates the complex ways in which the coercive 
powers of the State and the coercive powers of employers can intersect and reinforce 
each other.68 The obligations under section 10 are ripe for abuse without clear restrictions 
on the holding and sharing of police intelligence on trade unionists.69 Moreover, refusals 
to comply with the new legal provisions —for example, refusing to give the employer 
sight of the approval letter as soon as reasonably practicable — create further possibilities 
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for the prosecution of criminal offences and the use of powers of arrest for breaches of 
the peace. All of this should raise considerable alarm in its curtailment of civil liberties 
and the chilling effect on civic protest without any credible justification. We should also 
be vigilant lest the Government resurrects its more draconian proposals that were set out 
in the original BIS Consultation, if political circumstances change. 
B. Check Off, Facility Time and the Authoritarian State 
 
The crusade against facility time and the check off in the public sector had its origins in 
agitation from the Trade Union Reform Campaign and the Taxpayers’ Alliance during 
the period of the Coalition Government.70 In 2012, the Government announced plans to 
curtail facility time in the civil service,71 although it was envisaged that these restrictions 
would be rolled out across the public sector.72 These early initiatives envisaged an 
arbitrary set of restrictions on facility time, so that employer funding was required to be 
within 0.1% of the pay bill and no representative would normally be permitted to spend 
more than 50% of her time on union activities. These measures foreshadowed what was 
to come in the Trade Union Bill proposals. 
 Clause 14 in an early version of the Bill addressed ‘check off’ in the public sector. 
It was a prohibitive measure that simply provided that ‘No relevant public sector 
employer may make trade union subscription deductions from wages payable to 
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workers’. The scope of ‘relevant public sector employer’ was left to be defined by 
statutory instrument. Clauses 12 and 13 of the Bill addressed facility time in the public 
sector. The Government adopted a more complex approach, since a simple prohibition 
would have been incompatible with TULRCA 1992, s 168 which guarantees a right for a 
trade union official to be permitted reasonable paid time off to undertake specified union 
duties and industrial relations training. To this end, clause 12 specified a highly complex 
publication requirement for public sector employers to publish information on facility 
time. The detail of the reporting obligation was again to be filled by statutory instrument, 
with respect to the form and timing of information and the extension of the obligation to 
private bodies performing ‘functions of a public nature’. Clause 13 conferred reserve 
powers on a Minister to impose constraints on facility time with the purpose of limiting 
the percentage of a representative’s working time spent on facility time; and ensuring that 
the proportion of the pay bill expended on facility time did not exceed a specified 
percentage. There were further reserve powers to impose publication duties on public 
sector employers whose facility time was so limited.  
 The coercive reach of the relevant provisions in the Trade Union Act 2016 are 
significantly curtailed. In respect of ‘check off’, section 15 prefers a strategy of 
regulation and restriction over a strategy of prohibition.  The statutory provision permits 
deductions from workers’ wages in respect of trade union subscriptions where workers 
have the option to pay by other means, and arrangements have been made for the union 
‘to make reasonable payments to the employer in respect of the making of the 
deductions’. This provision remains limited to the ‘public sector employer’, to be defined 
by statutory instrument.  
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 In respect of facility time, the publication requirements as set out in the Bill are 
replicated in section 13 of the Act. The ‘reserve powers’ are, however, tightened up from 
the original and highly permissive formulation in the Bill, in section 14 of the Act. Thus, 
the Minister may only exercise the reserve powers once three years have elapsed from the 
first regulations on publication under section 13 coming into force, and the Minister is 
required to have regard to ‘information published by employers in accordance with the 
publication requirements; the cost to public funds of facility time in relation to each of 
those employers; the nature of the various undertakings carried on by those employers; 
any particular features of those undertakings that are relevant to the reasonableness of the 
amount of facility time;  any other matters that the Minister thinks relevant’. 
Furthermore, the Minister is required to give notice in writing to the employer ‘setting 
out the Minister’s concerns about the amount of facility time … and informing the 
employer that the Minister is considering exercising the reserve powers in relation to that 
employer’. The employer must have a ‘reasonable opportunity’ to respond to the 
Minister’s notice and to take ‘any action that may be appropriate in view of the 
concerns’; further, the reserve powers may not be exercised for a 12 month period once 
the Minister has given written notice to the employer. 
 The coercive imprint of sections 13–15 is much lighter than had been 
contemplated in the original Bill. As with the picketing provisions, however, these shifts 
likely reflect the unusual political circumstances of the current time rather than a 
Damascene turn away from authoritarianism. One of the truly remarkable features of the 
Bill was the highly centralised and coercive nature of these proposed measures. In effect, 
voluntary negotiated arrangements on check off and facility time across local government 
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and the wider public sector, some of which might be contractually binding in individual 
contracts of employment, were to be abolished or restricted in accordance with 
governmental fiat. This was a remarkable display of coercive power by the State, and it is 
one that does not find obvious parallels in the neo-liberal paradigm during the Thatcher 
years. It is not surprising that this centralised deployment of State coercion was 
challenged by key constituencies during the Parliamentary process.   
 Three sets of countervailing pressures may underpin the compromises in the Act 
on check off and facility time. First, the disruption and prohibition of collectively agreed 
arrangements cut across negotiated arrangements in local government. There was 
significant evidence that some local authorities were hostile to central governmental 
intervention of this nature,73 which undermined the Government’s own professed support 
for devolved power in the regions. The more restricted formulation of the reserve powers 
in section 14 creates a wider regulatory space for local arrangements to be negotiated 
autonomously by employers and trade unions, free from central government interference. 
Secondly, the devolved administrations in Scotland and Wales registered their own 
serious reservations about the impact of these measures on public service provision. 
According to the representatives from the devolved administrations, such interference 
was incompatible with the ethos of public services in the devolved administrations.74 It 
also undermined the distinctive approach to public sector industrial relations in Scotland 
and Wales, which involved constructive engagement with representative trade unions.75 
Finally, the proposed measures in the Bill constituted a direct interference with the 
                                                        
73 See, eg, written evidence of Tony Newman, Leader of Croydon Council (TUB47, 28 October 2015) 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmpublic/tradeunion/memo/tub47.htm> accessed 7 June 2016; written 
evidence of Doug Taylor, Leader of Enfield Council (TUB51, 28 October 2015) 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmpublic/tradeunion/memo/tub51.htm> accessed 7 June 2016.  
74 Trade Union Bill Deb 13 October 2015, cols 78–88. 
75 ibid. 
27 
 
contractual freedom of trade unions, employers and workers to negotiate their own 
arrangements.76 The ideological significance of this should not be underestimated. In 
some libertarian versions of conservative political thought, the coercive interference with 
a freely negotiated contract breaks a taboo, so totemic is the shibboleth of contractual 
freedom.77 This may be a context where friction between libertarian and authoritarian 
elements of conservative ideology led to a dilution of the Act’s direct coercive 
interference with freedom of contract. 
C. The CO and the Authoritarian State 
The CO performs a practically vital role in regulating trade union administrative affairs. 
The CO is appointed by the Secretary of State, who is subject to a duty to consult with 
ACAS on the appointment. It performs a range of administrative and adjudicative 
functions in relation to trade unions and employers’ association. These functions include: 
maintaining the list of trade unions and employers’ associations and determining the 
independence of trade unions; dealing with certain complaints from union members that 
the union has failed to maintain an accurate membership register, and exercising 
oversight of the its accounting records; dealing with complaints from members that the 
union has failed to comply with its statutory obligations in respect of certain internal 
elections; and exercising oversight over the maintenance and operation of the political 
fund.78  
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 As such the CO occupies an important albeit understated position in the 
institutional structure of British labour law. This should not obscure the political 
magnitude of the Trade Union Act’s overhaul of the CO’s functions. The institutional 
reforms of the CO are of major political importance. These changes have the potential to 
transform the CO from a neutral independent officer discharging largely administrative 
functions into a coercive and interventionist instrument of the State. This was described 
euphemistically by the BIS Consultation on Intimidation of Non-Striking Workers as a 
‘strengthened enforcement function’ for the CO.79 Speaking less euphemistically, the 
Trade Union Act confers new coercive powers on the CO that create the risk of arbitrary 
political interference in the internal affairs of trade unions. It is a chilling manifestation of 
the authoritarian State. In the House of Lords’ debate on the Bill, Lord Monks, who is not 
prone to dramatic hyperbole, described the reforms of the CO in stark terms:  
 
[T]he certification officer … will have the power to initiate investigations without 
the need for anybody to complain. The investigations can be outsourced—no 
doubt to expensive law firms and consultants … This is a big step towards state 
supervision of trade unions. It offends the principle of autonomy and is a distant 
echo—I emphasise ‘distant’—of a totalitarian and certainly an arrogant approach. 
Where is the justification for it? The certification officer deals perfectly 
adequately with complaints now and has not been seeking new powers.80 
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 The political transformation of the CO did not start with the Trade Union Act. It 
began with the expansion of the CO’s powers in the TLA (‘Gagging Act’) framework. 
This conferred new investigative powers on the CO, capable of being exercised at its own 
behest, to scrutinise the trade union’s compliance with requirements to maintain an 
accurate register of members’ names and addresses.81 The Trade Union Act builds upon 
this in four main ways. First, the content of the annual return has been expanded. Section 
7 provides that the annual return must now include detailed information on industrial 
action, and section 12 requires the inclusion of details of political expenditure where that 
expenditure exceeds £2000 in total in a calendar year, with the form and content of that 
information subject to highly prescriptive requirements. Secondly, Schedule 2 sets out the 
CO’s powers to initiate investigations at its own behest where it ‘is satisfied’ that relevant 
statutory duties have not been complied with, rather than being triggered by an individual 
member’s complaint Thirdly, once an investigation has been undertaken by the CO 
(which may be triggered at its own initiative), it is provided with a significant range of 
investigatory powers under Schedule 1.Finally, Schedule 3 gives the CO new draconian 
powers to impose financial penalties on the trade union, in addition to its existing 
enforcement powers. In effect, this gives the CO a power to impose quasi-criminal 
penalties on the trade union in what are properly regarded as civil matters. This quiet 
elision of the civil and criminal law is a perfect encapsulation of the authoritarian State. 
 It is significant that section 16 of the Act specifies that the CO ‘is not subject to 
directions of any kind from any Minister of the Crown as to the manner in which he is to 
exercise his functions’. Furthermore, the Government has now provided that the 
Commissioner for Public Appointments will henceforth regulate the appointment of the 
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CO.82 As Kahn-Freund’s reflections on the system of compulsory arbitration remind us, 
the exposure of arbitrators to binding Ministerial decree is the hallmark of a totalitarian 
State.83 Nevertheless, it is remarkable that the CO has undergone such a radical 
transformation, beginning with the TLA and now extended still further by the Trade 
Union Act, and for that to have occurred with scarcely a stir in mainstream political 
debate. Behind the mundane and extensive detail of the statutory reforms of the CO, we 
may be witnessing a set of changes that exemplify a tilt to the authoritarian right. 
6. FROM UNION DEMOCRACY TO THE MAINTENANCE OF SOCIAL 
ORDER 
The provisions in the Trade Union Act that have perhaps attracted the most sustained 
attention are the revised thresholds for pre-strike ballots. Section 2 stipulates a 
requirement that 50% of those entitled to vote did so, in order for the ballot to constitute a 
valid authorisation of the industrial action. This applies to all ballots under TULRCA 
1992, s 226. Section 3 stipulates a further requirement where ‘the majority of those who 
were entitled to vote in the ballot are at the relevant time normally engaged in the 
provision of important public services’, that ‘at least 40% of those who were entitled to 
vote in the ballot’ supported industrial action. The meaning of ‘important public services’ 
will be confined to services falling within the categories of health services; education of 
those aged under 17; fire services; transport services; decommissioning of nuclear 
installations and management of radioactive waste and spent fuel; and border security. 
Section 4 of the Act requires that the Secretary of State commission an independent 
review of electronic balloting in respect of strike ballots within a period of six months 
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from the passing of the Act. The legislation further permits the use of pilot schemes to 
inform the design and implementation of electronic balloting for strikes. 
 As with the political fund, it is perhaps tempting again to interpret these 
provisions through the lens of earlier debates under the Trade Union Act 1984, when 
strike ballots were first introduced by legislation into British labour law. In a valuable 
assessment of that period, Simon Auerbach drew attention to the balance between 
‘internal’ and ‘external’ justifications for the imposition of balloting requirements on 
trade unions.84 ‘External’ justifications were especially concerned with the minimisation 
of the effects of strike action on external constituencies, such as employers, service users 
and customers, or the wider ‘public’. Strict balloting requirements would tend to 
disinhibit precipitate strike action, so that the weapon was only deployed by trade unions 
as a last resort. ‘Internal’ justifications were especially concerned with the relations 
between the trade union leadership and its members. This often rested on a perception 
that a militant leadership might be subjected to internal democratic constraint by a more 
moderate ‘rank and file’ membership.85 During the debates that preceded the enactment 
of the Trade Union Act 1984, both types of justification had currency in the development 
of Conservative Party policy. While the ‘internal’ set of justifications was dominant at the 
level of political rhetoric in the enactment of the 1984 Act,86 Auerbach is surely correct to 
argue that the reality of the Government’s motivation was rather more complex. 
 Do the new provisions in section 2 and section 3 simply reflect a continuing mix 
of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ justifications for the revised ballot thresholds? To begin with, 
there are certain interpretive difficulties given the poor quality of the Government’s 
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documentary material explaining and justifying the ballot thresholds. The contrast in 
fluency between the flimflam of the BIS Consultation on Ballot Thresholds in Important 
Public Services and the 1983 Green Paper Democracy in Trade Unions87 is like the 
difference between water and wine. Nevertheless, it is possible to detect a shift in 
justificatory emphasis between then and now. Reading the BIS consultation on ballot 
thresholds, the standard 50% turnout threshold is justified principally on the basis of 
‘internal’ democratic arguments. According to the Consultation:  
 
 Disruptive industrial action should not take place on the basis of low ballot 
turnouts. Such action  does not always represent the views of all the union members and 
is undemocratic … A simple  majority (i.e. over 50% of votes cast) must be in favour in 
order for action to go ahead. This  ensures that strikes can only take place on the basis 
of clear support from union members.88  
 
 Once we turn to the ‘important public service’ threshold, the Consultation 
switches to an ‘external’ justification. According to the Consultation, such industrial 
action ‘can have far reaching effects on significant numbers of ordinary people who have 
no association with the dispute. People have the right to expect that services on which 
they and their families rely are not going to be disrupted at short notice by strikes that 
have the support of only a small proportion of union members’.89 This appeal to an 
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‘external’ justification is also reflected in the observation that the balloting thresholds 
will ensure that industrial action is only used ‘as a last resort’.90  
 What is especially interesting is the kaleidoscopic framing of the relevant 
conflicts between striking workers and other constituencies in the current political 
discourse. The Parliamentary debates reveal a range of shifting configurations. 
Sometimes the conflict is framed as one between public sector workers and private sector 
workers, as evident in the following display of mutual admiration:  
 
Richard Fuller (Bedford) (Con): My right hon. Friend was absolutely right to 
have a consultation on the additional 40% hurdle. He has talked about it in 
reference to the emergency services and other important services, but does he not 
agree that there is another issue: if we compare changes in strike action in the 
public and private sectors since the end of the last century, we see that over that 
15-year period the number of strike days in the private sector has halved, but in 
the public sector the number has doubled? Sajid Javid: My hon. Friend, as usual, 
makes an excellent point. That goes to the heart of the Bill and why we need these 
changes.91 
 
Sometimes the conflict between public and private sector workers is framed as a conflict 
between well-paid professional workers and those engaged in poorly paid and insecure 
employment in the private sector:  
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Robert Jenrick: Let me continue. Today the majority of those in trade unions are not 
the working poor—53% of members are in professional, associate professional or 
managerial occupations. Only a minority are in lower skilled, invariably lower-paid 
occupations, such as caring, leisure, processing, plant and machine work. Today’s 
trade unions predominantly serve middle-income workers. The figures show that 
those earning less than £250 a week—roughly the equivalent of a full-time job on the 
minimum wage—are the least likely to join a trade union. Just 13% of those workers 
are members, which is a smaller figure than the proportion of those earning more than 
£1,000 a week, who make up 22% of trade union members ... most working people in 
lower-skilled, lower-paid roles are not part of trade unions, and it is they who are 
most deeply impacted by the disruption of strikes, particularly in key public services, 
including education and transport.92 
 
The characterisation of the strike as involving a war between ‘worker as producer’ 
against ‘worker as consumer’,93 or as distributive conflicts between different groups of 
workers, is not new. It also invites uncomfortable questions of the Government, not least 
why private sector workers are working for low pay and in conditions of such rank 
insecurity. This state of affairs reflects the political and economic choices of a 
Government zealously committed to austerity and labour market deregulation. While 
distributive conflicts between different groups of workers are an important aspect of 
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labour law’s normative concerns,94 it is important not to lose sight of the agency of 
employers and/or the State in shaping, intensifying or even creating those conflicts in the 
first place. That seems especially pertinent here. What is significant about this mode of 
discourse is its underlying axiom that industrial conflict is a pathological disruption of the 
civic unity that should obtain in a political order. At its base, it is an anti-liberal doctrine 
that rejects the existence of pluralism in civil society, including pluralism between 
workers, and the fact that conflict is a healthy and legitimate manifestation of a liberal 
and democratic pluralism. The underlying justification for strike laws is the maintenance 
of the unity of the social order. 
 Taken on their own, the balloting threshold modifications and their underlying 
justifications might be vulnerable to trenchant criticism,95 but are not in themselves 
politically sinister. When considered in the wider context of the other authoritarian 
strands in the Trade Union Act, and the fact of their cumulative addition to an existing 
body of restrictive norms, the underlying repudiation of pluralism is very troubling. It is 
also important to anticipate the ways in which future governments might build upon these 
restrictions further. The concept of ‘important public services’ floats freely from the 
entirely distinct concept of ‘essential public services’ in international labour law.96 At 
various points, the Consultation seems to equate an ‘important public service’ as one 
where a strike would cause ‘serious disruption’ to consumers and service users.97 Since it 
is intrinsic to striking that it involves the infliction of ‘serious disruption’ on third parties, 
does this presage the expansion of the 40% support threshold to a much wider range of 
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‘important public services’? The idea of a universal 40% threshold is certainly 
countenanced by the authors of the Policy Exchange report.98 Might we see the transition 
from union coordinated ballots of their own members, towards the Conservative 
Manifesto’s commitment to ballots of the entire workforce, crossing the line into a system 
of ballots controlled and administered by the State? Presently, of course, it is true that 
strike ballots are a statutory requirement, but strike ballots are still properly regarded as 
instruments of union democracy applying to trade union members. The idea of workforce 
ballots, by contrast, would seem to contemplate a more statist model of mandatory ballots 
applying to every affected worker in the bargaining unit. The logical endpoint of the 2010 
Policy Exchange document ‘Modernising Industrial Relations’ is of course that strike 
action should only be permitted as an exceptional matter.99 The road to prohibition is 
unlikely to be traversed in a single step, and the prohibition of strikes can be achieved 
through legal techniques that are formally permissive but practically insurmountable. 
Repressive governments rarely advertise their authoritarianism in explicit terms. 
7. FUTURE PROSPECTS 
It is impossible to assess the full significance of the Trade Union Act 2016 on its words 
alone. The story of the Act remains to be told, and how it ends will depend upon the 
practical operation of the legislation, and the ways in which trade unions, employers and 
other actors adjust to the new regulatory landscape. There are three main dimensions to 
be considered as the story of the Act unfolds: the impact of devolution as a frictional 
constraint on Westminster government’s authoritarian agenda; the role of human rights as 
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a source of restraint on the legislation; and the strategic responses of trade unions and 
employers to the new legislative terrain.  
A. Devolution and Countervailing Power 
The Supreme Court judgment in Re Agricultural Sector (Wales) Bill; A-G for England 
and Wales v Counsel General for Wales was a watershed moment for labour law in the 
new constitutional order of devolved governance.100 In 2013, the system of Agricultural 
Wages Boards for England and Wales was abolished by section 72 of the Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform Act 2013. Following abolition, the Welsh Assembly passed 
legislation to establish a system of wages regulation for the Welsh agricultural sector. 
The Attorney General challenged this on the basis that the Welsh Assembly did not have 
the legislative competence to enact such a measure under the system of conferred powers 
established by the Government of Wales Act 2006 (GWA). According to the Attorney 
General, the legislation concerned the regulation of employment and industrial relations, 
which were not devolved matters. The Supreme Court rejected the challenge, and 
concluded that the enactment of the legislation was within the scope of the Assembly’s 
devolved powers since its purpose and effect was ‘related to’ agriculture, which was a 
conferred power under Schedule 7 of the GWA. While the Bill simultaneously concerned 
employment and industrial relations, this did not remove the Bill from the Assembly’s 
legislative competence. Schedule 7 sets out a list of exceptions to the conferral of 
agriculture to the Assembly, which included ‘occupational pensions’, but did not extend 
to other employment matters. For this reason, the fact that the Bill ‘related to’ terms and 
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conditions of employment in agriculture did not lead to the forfeiture of legislative 
competence. 
 During the passage of the Trade Union Act 2016, the devolution context 
(including the Supreme Court decision in the Agricultural Sector (Wages) Bill case) 
proved to be an important feature in political manoeuvring around the Trade Union Bill. 
For example, in the Second Reading debate in the House of Commons, opposition MPs 
from Wales and Scotland made specific criticisms of the Trade Union Bill on the basis of 
its impact on devolved public services in the Wales and Scotland; much of the criticism 
was concerned specifically with the issue of ‘facility time’ and ‘check off’ in the public 
sector.101 During the Public Committee hearings in the House of Commons, Leighton 
Andrews AM, Minister for Public Services, Welsh Government and Roseanna 
Cunningham, Cabinet Secretary for Fair Work, Skills and Training, Scottish Government 
were critical of the Bill’s disruption of devolution arrangements.102 These criticisms 
focused particularly on the 40% threshold in strike ballots in important public services. 
Referring to the Supreme Court decision, Leighton Andrews stated that  
 
What it confirmed in that case was that where an Assembly Bill fairly and 
realistically satisfies the test set out in section 108 of the Government of Wales Act 
2006 and is not within an exception, it does not matter whether it might also be 
capable of being classified as relating to a subject that has not been devolved, such as 
employment rights and industrial relations. The Trade Union Bill very clearly relates 
to devolved public services—that is the three obvious ones: fire and rescue, health 
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and, of course, education under 17, but potentially others as well. This clearly cuts 
across the devolution settlement, and we have very strong issues that we will be 
raising in that regard.103  
 
 The political manoeuvring around the legislation is unlikely to be finished. The 
Welsh Assembly may yet introduce legislation on strike ballots in public services, raising 
the prospect of further litigation in the Supreme Court.104 In a leaked letter from Nick 
Boles to Oliver Letwin and Chris Grayling, Boles indicated that the Government’s legal 
advice was that its position was especially weak in relation to the Welsh devolution 
settlement.105 Whatever the fate of any further litigation under the GWA, devolution has 
created new sites of countervailing power, federal rather than functional in nature, 
operating as a pluralist constraint on the escalating authoritarianism in Conservative 
ideology. This may lead to an emerging body of jurisprudence on ‘federal’ labour law, 
providing new opportunities for the devolved administrations, trade unions and workers 
to use litigation to challenge the new legislative agenda. This may be of some practical 
importance if the judicial screw tightens on trade union claims against the United 
Kingdom under Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
B. Human Rights and Countervailing Power 
The human rights context is in tremendous flux, and the extent to which human rights 
might be used to reshape or even challenge the operation of the Trade Union Act is 
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unusually opaque at the current time. How things unfold will depend upon the strategic 
choices of key actors: the judiciary in the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR); the 
role of human rights arguments in Parliamentary processes; and the attitude of the 
Government to human rights concerns. Each of these factors will be considered briefly. 
 As regards the ECtHR, the forward march of Article 11 to develop trade union 
rights was halted in National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers v UK 
(RMT).106 The Court determined that the elaborate and burdensome procedural 
requirements for notice in UK strike law did not constitute an ‘interference’ with Article 
11; and the ban on secondary industrial action, interfering with an ‘accessory’ rather than 
a ‘core’ trade union freedom under Article 11, was within the State’s wide margin of 
appreciation under Article 11(2). The decision is doctrinally odd, and may be explicable 
as a ‘political’ rather than a ‘legal’ decision, given the stated preference of some 
Government Ministers to withdraw from the ECHR.107 The renewed concern for 
‘subsidiarity’ in the lexicon of European human rights law no doubt reflects a political 
judgement by the Court as to how much external judicial intervention laggard states will 
tolerate before those states activate the nuclear option of withdrawal. The recent 
admissibility decision under Article 11, determining that the complaint concerning the 
abolition of the Agricultural Wages Board was inadmissible, is likely to fortify the 
suspicions of trade unionists that the ECtHR is no longer an independent bulwark against 
oppressive governments.108 It is also likely to fortify the boldness of those same states in 
fostering a culture of international impunity, at least as far as labour rights are concerned. 
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Until now, Article 11 has been a pivotal norm in galvanising a progressive agenda in 
collective labour law reform, and that may change now that the judicial ground has 
started to shift as in Unite the Union v UK and RMT. 
 Even if the judicial tide is turning, it is important not to underestimate the role of 
human rights arguments in the Parliamentary process. The extensive reliance on human 
rights arguments in the Parliamentary debates on the Trade Union Bill was especially 
striking. Sometimes this involved a moral appeal to the rhetorical ideal of human rights at 
work.109 Often, contributions to debates referred more precisely to specific provisions in 
international law, such as Article 11 of the ECHR,110 Article 5 of the European Social 
Charter,111 and relevant ILO instruments.112 Human rights concerns were also articulated 
and considered at the Public Committee stage in the House of Commons.113 The Joint 
Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) issued a report on the pre-legislative scrutiny of the 
Bill.114 Some of the Committee’s reflections on the human rights compatibility of the 
check off and facility time provisions are less pertinent to the final provisions in the Act, 
given political compromises during the late stages of the legislative process. This leaves 
the outstanding matter as the ballot threshold in ‘important public services’. Since the 
meaning of ‘important public services’ awaits clarification in a statutory instrument, the 
controversial measures on the 40% ballot thresholds will be subjected to post-legislative 
scrutiny by the JCHR, and it seems likely that the international law concept of ‘essential 
services’ may inform the Committee’s assessment of the ballot threshold.115 The 
Committee also noted the TUC’s submissions concerning the multiple ways in which the 
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Trade Union Bill violated standards in ILO instruments. The post-legislative scrutiny of 
the Act by the JCHR, once the relevant secondary legislation has been enacted, may yet 
prove to be decisive. This demonstrates the increasingly important role of Parliament and 
its committees in the protection of citizens’ fundamental human rights.116 It also counsels 
the need to evaluate the utility of human rights discourse beyond the narrow metric of 
success in litigation. 
 Finally, the Government’s approach to human rights has been informed by an 
ideological agenda that is fundamentally antithetical to the judicial protection of human 
rights. The sources of this antipathy are complex. It may reflect an alignment with 
ideologies of Conservatism that repudiates the very concept of human rights.117 It may 
also reflect constitutional concerns to limit ‘excessive’ judicial power, and to limit 
external interferences with national sovereignty through the binding requirements of 
international law. Both of these preoccupations are surely reflected in the activities of 
Policy Exchange’s ‘Judicial Power Project’,118 and in the recent changes to paragraph 1.2 
of the Ministerial Code where the reference to ‘international law and treaty obligations’ 
was excised from the definition of the Minister’s overarching obligation to comply with 
the law.119   
 This contempt for human rights law was displayed most starkly in Sajid Javid’s 
letter to the JCHR of 5th January 2016.120 The letter sets out a rebuttal of the potential 
human rights concerns raised by the Bill. In terms of its wider significance, two points 
should be emphasised. First, the Government is now placing heavy emphasis on the 
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decision in RMT v UK, and the strong notion of subsidiarity reflected in a very wide 
margin of appreciation for states. As the trenchant criticisms set out in Frances O’Grady’s 
letter to the JCHR of 20th January 2016 make clear, RMT cannot bear the argumentative 
weight that is being placed upon it by the Government.121 The attempts to invoke the 
margin of appreciation in order to insulate the Act from any form of Article 11 challenge 
is unsustainable, since RMT is relevant only to ‘accessory’ freedoms under Article 
11(1).122 Secondly, the Annex to the Minister’s letter contains a most extraordinary 
repudiation of the system of binding treaties under the ILO framework. According to the 
Annex, ILO Conventions ‘are not documents which are subject to judicial enforcement in 
an international court’; the Committee of Experts and the Committee on Freedom of 
Association ‘fulfil an informal advisory role, and are not recognised under the ILO 
Constitution’; and the Government ‘does not therefore accept that the UK’s trade union 
legislation to date, nor the provisions in the Bill, are contrary to the ILO Conventions’.123 
While all of these propositions are false as a matter of positive international law, they 
reveal a Governmental mind-set that is chilling in its cursory disregard for human rights 
and international law. Indeed, it is tantamount to a wholesale rejection of the very idea of 
international labour law as establishing binding norms for signatory states. With the 
prospect of repeal of the Human Rights Act 1998 now a clear political possibility, the 
future of human rights as a legal strategy for workers’ emancipation is now very finely 
poised. 
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C. The Trade Union Act in Practice: Trade Union and Employer Responses 
Any assessment of the legislation must await an assessment of how trade unions and 
employers respond to its provisions. As the experience of the 1980s with statutory 
balloting requirements demonstrates, the impact of legislation may be very different from 
that which is anticipated by its authors.124 Trade unions may adjust their behaviour to the 
new requirements of the legislation, even turning it to their advantage.125 Employers may 
not be willing partners with the Government in the use of legal sanctions to resist 
solidaristic practices in the workplace. It may be that the legislation has intervened in 
trade union affairs to such a grave extent that it prompts a backlash by trade unions and 
workers, leading to an escalation in various forms of official and unofficial industrial 
action. 
 Although it is inevitably speculative to predict the use of the Act by employers, 
there is little sign of strong employer appetite for a new era of confrontation using the 
expanded armoury of legal countermeasures in the Act. For example, the Government 
proposals to lift the ban on using agency workers in strike disputes were not welcomed 
by the trade organisation representing recruitment agencies, the Recruitment and 
Employment Confederation.126 While the CBI and the British Chambers of Commerce 
supported the measures on the strike ballot thresholds at the Public Committee stage, both 
organisations were criticised by some members of the Committee for failing to produce 
objective evidence for their organisations’ respective positions on the ‘problem’ of 
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disruptive and unrepresentative strike action.127 The new provisions on notice periods, 
ballot mandate periods, and the content of the balloting paper all expand the opportunities 
for employers to seek injunctions. Nevertheless, if employers are unwilling to exploit 
these new opportunities, the legislation empowers the State itself to use coercion directly, 
for example through the penal measures administered by the CO. In this way, the 
enforcement pressures on employers may be less pronounced than under the statutory 
reforms during the 1980s. 
 For trade unions, the strategic calculations are rather more complex. Trade unions 
will continue to use their organisational ingenuity to make the best of a bad set of laws. If 
electronic balloting is eventually introduced for strike ballots, for example, this could 
provide a way of promoting the participation of the membership in collective action. 
Where the ballot thresholds prove difficult for some unions to meet,128 we may see new 
forms of civil disobedience in the industrial sphere deployed by trade unions in open 
defiance of what are regarded as oppressive laws. Some trade unions such as UNITE 
seem to be preparing for civil disobedience to defy the legislation. 129 The setting of the 
time frame of the ballot mandate to 6 months could lead to a sharp escalation in industrial 
conflict as trade unions seek to maximise their industrial advantage before the ballot 
mandate elapses.130 The detailed crystallisation of the matters in dispute on the ballot 
paper may lead to an entrenched bargaining stance by the trade union, for fear that any 
compromise can be used by the employer to cast doubt on the original ballot mandate and 
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so seek an injunction against the trade union.131 In short, the effect of the legislation may 
be to precipitate the escalation of strike action, rather than the pacification of trade 
unions. Finally, trade unions may themselves seek to challenge the legislation in the 
ECtHR or use human rights arguments in domestic courts. That will depend upon the 
attitudes of trade unions to the use of international human rights norms, and whether the 
growing disdain for law amongst trade unionists extends to the legal concept of human 
rights. Decisions such as Unite the Union v UK132 are unlikely to raise the general 
prestige of human rights litigation in the trade union movement at the current time.  
 It must not be assumed that escalating levels of unofficial strike action and 
leverage protest, and bitter discord in civil society, will be adjudged a mark of failure by 
the architects of the Trade Union Act 2016. The social problem of ‘intimidation’ by 
striking workers, or the need to preserve ‘social order’, provides populist cover for a new 
and decisive round of repressive and directly coercive measures, especially through 
criminalisation. Historically, State authoritarianism and the discourse of crisis have been 
strongly aligned. These are the tragic dilemmas of disobedience now faced by the trade 
union movement and other actors in civil society. 
8. CONCLUSION: NEW MAPS AND UNCHARTED TERRITORY  
 
‘There is a greater risk of authoritarianism in our society today than in 1912. 
Britain today may be a more “equal” society than in 1912; but it is markedly less 
equal than in 1952. “An unequal society”, Laski justly wrote, “always lives in 
fear, with a sense of impending disaster in its heart”. The policies of restriction, 
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fashioned fearfully as the reserve arm for the market economy, already contains 
the seeds of decreasing liberalism.’133 
 
These words were written by Lord Wedderburn in 1982. Looked at from the vantage 
point of 2016, those words are remarkably prophetic. Indeed, it might be argued that 
Wedderburn’s chilling assessment of labour law circa 1982 directly undermines the 
thesis defended here, that we are now moving beyond neo-liberalism into the realm of 
anti-liberal labour law. For, if Wedderburn’s view is correct, State authoritarianism was 
an indelible feature of the ‘New Right’ reforms during the period 1979-1997. 
 
The dawn of this new political order means that labour lawyers must reappraise their use 
of ideological categories in understanding legislative developments. Perhaps we were all 
so dazzled by the brilliance of Wedderburn’s Hayekian analysis of the legal ideology of 
modern Conservatism that Hayek was left imprinted on our retinas.134 Now we labour 
lawyers are apt to see his influence everywhere. At times, this may have undermined our 
ability to understand what was in front of our eyes. Sometimes it has led to ‘neo-
liberalism’ being understood in such catholic terms that it risked becoming vacuous as an 
analytical tool. If the Employment Act 1982, the Employment Relations Act 1999 and the 
Trade Union Act 2016 could all be described as ‘neo-liberal’, the meaning of ‘neo-
liberal’ being deployed probably risks collapsing the term into banality. The ‘Hayek’ 
critique also missed the internally complex and contested character of Conservative 
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political thought throughout the 20th century.135 According to the historian of 
Conservative political thought, E.H.H. Green,  
 
‘Scholars of Socialism and Liberalism in Britain and continental Europe have 
shown that the political ideologies of the Left and Centre are very complex 
structures in terms of both theory and practice, and that it is in many respects 
more accurate to speak about Socialisms and Liberalisms rather than to use the 
singular. The same thing is true of Conservatism.’136  
 
This sets itself against reductive tendencies in ideological characterisations of 
legislative programmes. 
 
Wedderburn was surely correct, therefore, in identifying an encroaching 
authoritarianism in 1982, and an anti-liberal repudiation of freedom as the structuring 
principle of political intervention. That would not be an especially Hayekian 
characteristic of legal ideology, although Hayek was certainly committed to the ‘strong 
state’ as the basis for liberal freedom.137 Nevertheless, Conservative political thought 
throughout that period would have been structurally rather complex, with authoritarian 
elements of Conservative ideology overlapping and intersecting with the more liberal 
concerns of thinkers such as Hayek. This authoritarian strand owes more to Conservative 
thinkers who repudiated liberalism, such as the German jurist Carl Schmitt, than it does 
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to the liberal patterns of thought on display in Friedrich von Hayek’s work.138 In short, 
Conservative thought in the post-war period is simply not reducible to a parsimonious set 
of intellectual influences, even if Hayek was the dominant influence shaping labour 
legislation during the 1980s. As Scruton has observed,  ‘in politics, the conservative 
attitude seeks above all for government, and regards no citizen as possessed of a natural 
right that transcends his obligation to be ruled.’139 This account of the ‘conservative 
attitude’ suggests that Conservative political thought has always been highly permeable 
to authoritarian modes of governance, alongside more liberal influences. 
 
In my view, we are nevertheless witnessing a critical shift in that complex mosaic of 
influences. The Trade Union Act 2016 represents the growing ascendancy of a more 
authoritarian style of Conservative governmental practice and political thought: it is 
beyond neo-liberalism, because it is not a liberal doctrine at all. According to Dyzenhaus, 
Schmitt’s political thought postulates politics as the urgent quest to ‘create a normal 
situation out of the chaos of pluralism by making a genuinely political, sovereign 
decision. Such a decision must distinguish clearly between friend and enemy; it attempts 
to establish a society only of friends, of those who fit the criteria of substantive 
homogeneity.’140 This demanded nothing less than the destruction of parliamentary 
democracy and the elimination of pluralism. It required the leader of the political 
community to identify the ‘friend’ in the pluralist divide and to repel the ‘enemy’, and the 
maintenance of a stable social order in the political community. There is little space in 
this conception of politics for those who dissent. The constitutional constraints of 
                                                        
138 For an excellent recent engagement with these different elements of conservative political thought, see David Dyzenhaus and 
Thomas Poole (eds), Law, Liberty and State: Oakeshott, Hayek and Schmitt on the Rule of Law (CUP 2015). 
139 Roger Scruton, The Meaning of Conservatism (Palgrave Macmillan, 2001) 5. 
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democratic deliberation, liberal rights, and the checks and balances of parliamentary 
government, suffocate the practice of authentic politics, where the primacy of the 
sovereign’s will comes to the fore.141 Economic and political crises of the kind that we 
are currently experiencing provide the moments through which this ‘authentic’ politics is 
able to break through the constitutional surface.  
 
History teaches us that trade unions are often the first casualty in the coercive 
enforcement of political unity. We see signs of it also in the growing hostility towards 
irregular migrants, and the increasing use of criminalisation to stigmatise irregular 
migrants.142 In the Schmittian politics of friend and enemy, the battle lines are 
increasingly clear to see. What liberals see as the coarsening decline and violence of 
political discourse in the recent EU Referendum debates, particularly the rhetoric around 
migration and nationalism, anti-liberals would regard as the redemption of authentic 
politics. Across Europe the political centre of gravity has tilted to the right in countries 
like Poland, Austria, Hungary and the United Kingdom. Alongside the rise of far right 
groups, the mainstream political right in Europe and the United States is now being 
reconfigured in more strongly authoritarian terms. It would be foolish to suggest that we 
have reached the end of liberal politics. It would be equally foolish to wilfully ignore 
what is before us. For Kahn-Freund, the link between industrial freedom and political 
freedom was always fundamental to his theory of labour law. As we face the Trade Union 
Act 2016, it is now time to reclaim that liberal vision as our own.  There is still 
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everything to play for, and play we must, because everything is now at stake. Liberal 
democracy is a fragile achievement. If we lose in the battles to come, the existential crisis 
of labour law may prove to be an existential crisis of the liberal democratic order itself. 
 
 
 
